

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

28 January 1976

Dear Ms. Rosenberger:

Herewith some ideas. I have underlined those we believe would do the most good. You will recognize we are putting ideas in the President's mouth he may not agree with, but how else to find out? Point six is drawn from the "Vail Book" and probably should be cleared with Mike Duval. The most useful thing the President can say is that the Agency is not going to be put out of business.

One general suggestion. This audience has heard all the old chestnuts (Nathan Hale, "your failures are trumpeted--", etc.) a hundred times. Stress instead things that are closer to the professional's real world. The themes we suggest would be meaningful to such an audience. But, as I said on the phone, it is essential to get the terminology right or the impact is lost.

If you need advice or help, you can call me

[redacted]
[redacted] at any time.

[redacted]
Richard Lehman

Enclosure:
As Stated

P.S. The last underlined sentence was added by Mr. Bush. The President has given him this assurance. He believes it important the President say this, although this may not be the right place or the right time.

RL



1. The Nation's professional intelligence officers, particularly those in CIA, have taken a hell of a beating in the past year. I am not here to beat on you some more. Rather, I depend on you as our nation's first line of defense. ✓

2. Over the past thirty years intelligence has become increasingly important in national policy-making. (See attachment). ✓

3. In the face of great difficulties, you have met these standards (pp 6-7 of attachment). You deliver to my desk each morning intelligence which is objective, responsible, and relevant. You have served the nation better than it has served you of late. ✓

4. We place great weight on the objectivity of your reporting. We pay too little attention, however, to another kind of objectivity--the Community's willingness to undertake candid self-assessment. Little note has been taken that you investigated yourselves and set your own houses in order before any external investigation began. Little note has been taken that the criticisms of your performance are based selectively on your own self-criticism. And no note is taken that the purpose of these assessments is to correct short-comings.

5. ~~I have no intention to see you put out of business. Rather, I believe the principles upon which CIA was founded are as valid today as they were in 1947.~~ In the next few weeks we will be making some changes, but they will be aimed at strengthening the concept of central intelligence, not of weakening it. ✓

6. The following principles were suggested to me by my staff as a basis for reexamination of the Intelligence Community.

- There needs to be a strong and independent head of the Intelligence Community who is not so committed to one bureaucracy as to lose his objectivity.
- The Community leader should have enough of an institutional "base" to maintain his independence.
- There should be "competition" in the production of intelligence, with good coordination among the agencies.
- *The President* ~~You~~ should have direct access to an intelligence official who does not have major foreign affairs or defense policy responsibilities.

- Any organizational changes should be designed to promote technological creativity, such as that which led to development of the U-2's and later technological successes.

~~I endorse them all.~~

7. I endorse these principles, and would add two more. We must maintain our capabilities for clandestine collection and for covert action. ✓

8. For those of you who have responsibilities in this field, let me say that I know of no more dedicated and skillful group of professionals in the federal service. I want to assure you that I am taking a personal interest in ensuring that you are adequately protected overseas. And I am determined that this government will stand behind the pledges you have given to your sources that their confidentiality will be maintained. ✓

9. You have had a bad period. I want to assure you that it is not endless. In fact, the end is in sight, and with it a chance for you to give full attention to intelligence. You have stood up to your problems well, as befits professionals with a sense of duty and ^{de}esprit ~~de~~ corps. I congratulate you for it. And I want to state again my admiration for Bill Colby's leadership in this most trying of times. ✓

10. George Bush has said that he sees his first task as restoration of public confidence in CIA. I never lost my confidence in it, and I will back him to the hilt in his efforts.

In order to help accomplish this, I have assured the new
Director that he has direct access to me whenever he needs
it.

--Second, one important aspect of this task is prevent the policy-maker from being taken by surprise by an event to which our interests require that he immediately respond. Please note that this is quite different from the prediction of such an event. Here our record is far from perfect, but still very good indeed.

The traditional--or pre-1939--view of intelligence was one of the spy seeking the enemy's war plans, of the single nugget of information which, if placed in the hands of the national leadership, could make the difference between peace and war. This concept is totally out of date. In today's complex world intelligence plays a continuous, major, and essential role in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy and in the foreign aspects of national economic policy, as well as in the equipping and deployment of our military forces.

Few would argue that there have been no fundamental changes in the world over the past three decades. So much has been written about these changes that many of the descriptive phrases have become cliches--the fragmentation of Stalin's monolithic communism, nuclear parity, an era of negotiation replacing an era of confrontation, the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world, increased consciousness of the third world, the growth of the nuclear club,

international economic competition replacing the threat of nuclear war, the food-population problem, the growing power of the oil-rich nations, and international terrorism. Hackneyed as these expressions may be, they evoke the images of change that have occurred in the last quarter century.

Against this backdrop of a changing world, this nation needs the best information and judgments about what is going on abroad so that it can survive and prosper--and its intelligence structure should be in a position to satisfy this need. This nation needs a basic understanding of the factors and trends that affect developments in the world abroad. This must be based on research and analysis of information from all sources, not just from secret and official sources of information but also from the cornucopia of open literature and academic research available on much of the developed world. Much of this information is highly fragmentary and much of the academic research is highly specialized. The task for intelligence is to analyze and integrate this material into assessments and judgments relevant to our nation's concerns abroad.

Let me digress for a moment to illustrate the complexity of this process by tracing one thread through it. The potential effectiveness of Soviet ICBM forces against our defense installations is obviously a matter of vital national interest. The most important single

factor in assessing effectiveness is the accuracy of each type of ICBM. One factor in accuracy is the quality of the guidance system, one factor in that is the quality of the accelerometers used, and one factor in that is the method by which accelerometers are suspended.

Answering the effectiveness question involves tracing a myriad of similar threads. It requires coordinating the work of hundreds, even thousands, of specialists in subjects as narrow as the method of suspending Soviet accelerometers. It requires aggregating their work into ever broader assessments, until finally a coherent answer to a crucial national question can be given.

From such assessments of the past and present must flow projections as far into the future as may be needed to permit policy formulation and planning for negotiation and action. And, a continuous flow of timely information and analyses is needed to update these assessments and projections and to alert our policy makers to new opportunities or potential crises so that they can plan accordingly.

Who are these policy makers? In the first instance they are the President and the other members of the National Security Council--the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. They include the

members of the Staff of the National Security Council and the appropriate staffs of the various members of the Council itself. They include the Secretary of the Treasury and other senior economic officers. Members of certain committees of the Congress are now being informed of foreign developments on a regular basis. These committees include Subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House, and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the International Affairs Committee of the House. Other Committees and Members of the Congress are provided with intelligence on foreign developments in response to their specific requests.

The subject matter of intelligence has expanded from its older focus on foreign military capabilities to include foreign political dynamics, economic trends, scientific capabilities, and sociological pressures. Today's intelligence deals with foreign policy problems ranging from the law of the seas to the oil boycott, from defense policy to arms control.

Along with this expansion of the scope and role of intelligence has come an increase in reliance on information acquired by sophisticated technical devices on the one hand and on open literature on the other, there has thus been a relative decrease in reliance on traditional

clandestine collection. Clandestine collection or espionage

nevertheless remains essential, but it is now reserved for the most important information which cannot be acquired by other means. It is focused largely on the major closed societies that could threaten our security, that do not have a free press, and that screen their military capabilities and much of their government process even from their own citizens.

The forms intelligence may take in giving the policy-maker the information he needs to do his job will vary. They range from the dissemination of single raw intelligence reports to complex analytical memoranda or national intelligence reports. They may include oral briefings or daily publications on world-wide developments. In fast-moving situations intelligence seeks to distill from the mass of fragmentary information that pours into Washington. From the process come coherent situation reports that enable the policy maker to keep track of and to anticipate events.

In meeting these needs the Intelligence Community must measure up to a number of demanding standards:

--If intelligence is to provide meaningful and timely support, its reporting and analysis must cover and integrate all facets of foreign developments--military, political, economic, scientific, and sociological.

--Intelligence must also be responsible--clear cut; sharp; neither alarmist nor complacent--if it is to serve as a reliable basis for decision.

--Effective intelligence must also avoid the bureaucratic penchant for ambiguities or delphic generalities which by anticipating all possible eventualities frustrate meaningful retrospective examination.

--Intelligence must be relevant. It must be responsive to the policy-maker's concerns, and it must go beyond and answer the questions he perhaps should have asked and did not.

--Finally, and most important, intelligence must be ^{only then} responsible. It must be independent of partisan preference or loyalty to preconceived judgments. It must never be distorted to support of budgetary desires.

~~Mr. Chairman, I would now like to illustrate in some detail the kinds of problems that we consider important and the kinds of substantive services that national intelligence provides. I hope these examples will make clear the breadth and complexity of our work and the close relationship it bears to the making of national policy. For convenience I will discuss these topics by~~